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THE UNITED STATES RESERVATION TO THE BAN ON
THE DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS: AN
APPRAISAL UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Ved P. Nanda*
INTRODUCTION
After the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratifica-
tion of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant), 1 the United States deposited its instrument of ratifica-
tion on June 8, 1992,2 subject to several reservations.3 One of the
reservations, on which I will comment here, relates to the ban on
sentencing criminal offenders under eighteen years of age to death.
The pertinent provision in the Covenant reads: "Sentence of death
shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eigh-
teen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women."4
Under the said reservation, the United States reserves "the right,
subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punish-
ment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted
under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital
punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed by
persons below eighteen years of age."5
In its latest pronouncement on the subject, the consolidated deci-
sions of Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri,' the U.S.
* Evans University Professor and Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law, University of Denver.
I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Gary Young, J.D. 1992, University of Denver
College of Law.
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the United States Sept. 8, 1992)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
2. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992).
3. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 21-24, reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
658-59 (1992).
4. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 6(5), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
5. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 2, at 11, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 653.
6. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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Supreme Court by a majority of five-to-four affirmed the lower
court's imposition of capital punishment on two individuals for
crimes they committed under the age of eighteen on the ground that
such imposition does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.7 At present, seventeen states authorize capital punish-
ment for criminal offenders under eighteen years of age, and eight
do not specify a minimum age for the imposition of capital punish-
ment.' However, I will argue that the United States should join an
overwhelming majority of nations by withdrawing its reservation on
imposing capital punishment committed by persons below eighteen
years of age. Alternatively, I will argue that the U.S. Supreme
Court should decide that imposition of the death penalty on criminal
offenders under eighteen years of age is violative of the Eighth
Amendment. The Court should be informed in its deliberations to-
ward reaching such a conclusion by evolving international norms.
The next section examines the pertinent U.S. practice. This is fol-
lowed by a study of emerging international standards covering the
death penalty for juveniles. This includes a review of pertinent inter-
national agreements, state practice of nations (especially those that
share the Anglo-American heritage), and the views of respected pro-
fessional organizations. The concluding section contains my
recommendations.
I. PERTINENT UNITED STATES PRACTICE
A. In General
At the end of 1991, the number of persons sentenced to death in
the United States reached 2,482.1 Of those, ninety-three were eigh-
teen or nineteen years old when sentenced, and eight were less than
seventeen years old when sentenced.' Since 1973 - when states
began adopting new statutes for death penalties following the Su-
preme Court's 1972 decision effectively striking down the then-ex-
7. Id. at 380. The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
VIll. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Eighth Amendment protec-
tions are incorporated and made applicable to the states: Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
667 (1962).
8. See Lawrence A. Greenfeld, Capital Punishment 1991, in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, at 7 (1992).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 10.
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isting death penalty statutes" - through the end of 1992, 114
death sentences have been imposed on juveniles. 2
Thirty-six states have capital punishment statutes. 3 Eleven states
and the federal government require a person to be at least eighteen
years of age at the time the offense was committed to be eligible for
the death penalty.' 4 In Georgia, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
and Texas, the offender must have been seventeen years old when
the crime occurred, although in North Carolina, if the individual
was incarcerated for murder when the subsequent murder occurred,
the age may be fourteen. Death penalty statutes in Alabama, Indi-
ana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
Oklahoma, and Wyoming apply to offenders who are sixteen years
old. 5 In Virginia, the age is fifteen; in Arkansas and Utah it is four-
teen; and in South Dakota, a ten-year-old offender may be eligible
for capital punishment, but only after a transfer hearing whereby
the juvenile is tried as an adult. 6 Eight states - Arizona, Dela-
ware, Florida, Idaho, Montana, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Washington - do not specify an age for death penalty eligibility.' 7
B. Case Law
1. Historical Context - Application of Common Law Principles
It was not until 1962 that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 8 Until then, most challenges to the death pen-
alty were heard by state courts applying common law principles.
To place this discussion in an historical context, the American
colonies relied upon several treatises which contained interpretations
of the common law as it had been developed and practiced in Eng-
land. Among the more popular works in the new colonies was
11. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
12. See Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today 4 (Feb. 1, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
13. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND, DEATH Row, U.S.A. 7 (1992) [hereinafter
DEATH Row].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); see supra note 7.
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Blackstone's Commentaries, published in 1768.19 On the topic of
juvenile culpability for criminal acts, Blackstone wrote, "Infants
under the age of discretion ought not to be punished by any criminal
prosecution whatever. What the age of discretion is, in various na-
tions, is [a] matter of some variety."2 In England, Blackstone re-
ported, a child under the age of seven could not be found guilty of a
felony, "for then a felonious discretion is almost an impossibility in
nature."21 Under the age of fourteen, a child was prima facie inno-
cent, but this presumption could be overcome by evidence that the
juvenile was "doli incapax" and "could discern between good and
evil." 22
Applying these common law principles, English courts condemned
to death a thirteen-year-old girl and two boys, ages ten and eight.
The girl was reportedly burned to death. The two boys were
hanged .3
As they considered cases involving juvenile felons, Colonial and
state courts relied upon the rules developed by English courts. Not
surprisingly, their results mirrored those of their counterparts in
England.2" Between 1642 and 1986, 281 persons who committed
19. See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted". The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 862 (1969).
20. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *22.
21. 4 id. at *23.
22. 4 id.; see also 1 LORD COKE'S FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 136 n.(f) (J.H.
Thomas ed., Alexander Towar, Philadelphia 1836):
In criminal cases, an infant of the age of fourteen years, may be capitally punished
for any capital offence; but under the age of seven he cannot. The period between the
age of seven and fourteen is subject to much uncertainty, for the infant shall, gener-
ally speaking, be judged prima facie innocent; yet if he was doli incapax and could
discern between good and evil at the time of the offence committed, he may be con-
victed, and undergo judgment and execution of death, though he was not attained to
years of puberty or discretion; for in such case the maxim of the law is, that "malitia
supplet aelatem."
I id.
23. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *23-24. "But by the law, as it now stands and has stood
at least since the time of Edward the third, the capacity of doing ill, or contracting guilt, is not so
much measured by the years and days, as by the strength of the delinquint's [sic] understanding
and judgment." 4 id. at *23.
24. See, e.g., State v. Bostick, 4 Harr. 563 (Del. 1845) (holding that a girl between twelve and
thirteen was presumptively not incapable of arson); Angelo v. People, 96 Ill. 209 (1880) (stating
that proof that an eleven-year-old was capable of committing a felony must be clear and strong);
State v. Doherty, I Tenn. (2 Overt.) 79, 88 (1806) (stating that the law presumed a fourteen-
year-old is doli incapax and one between seven and fourteen years of age was not and that this
presumption could be overcome by proof of consciousness of wrong.); Wusnig v. State, 33 Tex.
651 (1871) (stating that under Texas statutes, a person between the ages of nine and thirteen
could be convicted of any offense, unless it was proved that the person understood the illegality of
1314
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crimes while under the age of eighteen were executed in the United
States. 5 Of this group, as many as 126 were less than seventeen
years old.2"
Although only a few reported cases exist of juveniles whose death
sentence appeals were heard in state courts prior to 1962, the re-
ported decisions share some similarities. First, most of the defend-
ants were black. Second, the opinions reflected a restatement of the
common law principle of juvenile criminal incapacity expressed by
Blackstone and others. In particular, the decisions noted that the
presumption of incapacity for persons between seven and fourteen
years of age was rebuttable. 7
the offense.); State v. Leonard, 41 Vt. 585, 587 (1869) (stating that whether someone over the age
of seven had the capacity to commit a crime was a question of fact and that there was a prima
facie assumption that a fourteen-year-old has capacity).
25. 1 VICTOR L. STREIB. DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 55 (1987)
26. 1 Id. at 57.
27. See State v. Aaron, 4 N.J.L. 269, 276-77 (N.J. 1818). The court in Aaron stated:
It is perfectly settled that an infant within the age of seven years cannot be punished
for any capital offence, whatever circumstances of mischievous intention may be
proved against him, for by the presumption of the law, he cannot have discretion to
discern between good and evil and against this presumption no averment can be ad-
mitted. It is perfectly settled, also, that between the age of seven and the age of
fourteen years, the infant shall be presumed to be incapable of committing crime
upon the same principle, the presumption being very strong at seven, and decreasing
with the progress of his years; but then this presumption, in this case, may be encoun-
tered by proof; and if it shall appear by strong and irresistible evidence that he had
sufficient discernment to distinguish good from evil, to comprehend the nature and
consequences of his acts, he may be convicted and have judgment of death.
Id.; see also State v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163, 174 (N.J. 1828). The court in Guild stated:
With respect to the ability of persons of his age, to commit crimes of this nature, the
law is, that under the age of seven, they are deemed incapable of it. Between seven
and fourteen, if there be no proof of capacity, arising out of the case, or by the testi-
mony of witnesses, the presumption is in their favour; a presumption however growing
weaker and more easily overcome, the nearer they approach to fourteen. And at the
age of this defendant [twelve], sufficient capacity is generally possessed in our state of
society, by children of ordinary understanding, and having the usual advantages of
moral and religious instruction.
Id.; see also Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323, 327-28 (1858). The court in Godfrey stated:
An infant above seven, but under fourteen years of age, is presumed not to have such
knowledge and discretion, as would make him accountable for a felony committed
during that period. But, if the presumption is met by evidence clearly proving the
existence of that knowledge and discretion deemed requisite to a legal accountability,
the reason for allowing an immunity from punishment ceases, and, with it, the rule
which grants such immunity ceases.
Id.; see also Martin v. State, 90 Ala. 602, 608 (1890). The court in Martin stated:
[l]n the case of a minor between seven and fourteen years of age, the presumption is,
that he or she had not the requisite guilty knowledge of wrongfulness or wickedness of
the act charged, to authorize a conviction of felony. But the presumption is only
prima facie and may be rebutted by clear evidence of a mischievous discretion, or by
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 42:1311
Under the common law, proof of capacity in a capital case was a
pivotal question that could mean the difference between life and
death for a defendant. State courts were careful to ensure that when
capacity was challenged, the prosecutor produced substantial rebut-
tal evidence.2"
2. Mitigation
State courts were also cognizant of the individual characteristics
of young defendants, though the first use of such evidence could
scarcely be called mitigating. Among the evidence the jury was
asked to consider in the 1858 Alabama murder trial of an eleven-
year-old named Godfrey, for example, was "his condition as a negro
and a slave."2'9 This evidence did not help young Godfrey avoid
proof of knowledge of good and evil, which knowledge must be distinctly made to
appear from the evidence.
Id.; see also Ridge v. State, 229 P. 649, 650 (Okla. Crim. App. 1924). The court in Ridge stated:
In this state children between the ages of 7 and 16 years are presumed to be incapa-
ble of committing crime, but that presumption may be overcome by a showing made
in a juvenile court that the child has sufficient understanding and intelligence to know
right from wrong.
Id.; see also Clay v. State, 196 So. 462, 463 (Fla. 1940). The court in Clay stated:
It is well established at common law that a child under the age of 7 years is conclu-
sively presumed to be incapable of committing a crime; the common law rule raises a
presumption of incapacity of an infant between the ages of 7 and 14; and the pre-
sumption is that the incapacity after 7 years of age decreases with the progress of his
years.
Id.
For a modern statement of this common law rule, see Adams v. Maryland, 262 A.2d 69, 72
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 (1970).
28. See, e.g., Aaron, 4 N.J.L. at 285 ("And so ought the jury and the court here to be satisfied,
and satisfied beyond the possibility of question."); Martin, 90 Ala. at 606 (stating that the jury
must be satisfied "beyond all reasonable doubt"). One form of evidence prosecutors often pro-
duced was a defendant's confession. These were sometimes obtained under dubious circumstances.
The court in Aaron was suspicious of the child's confession. "The infant is not to be convict of his
own confession," the court wrote. 4 N.J.L. at 278. Ten years later, however, the same court
reached a different result when the confessions of a twelve-year-old murder suspect were chal-
lenged on appeal. Young Guild, while jailed for five months, was apparently told he would soon
die anyway, so he might as well confess. Guild, 10 N.J.L. at 182. He did confess and the court
ruled that since he had nothing to gain by confessing, all hope being lost, he must have told the
truth. Id. at 183. Guild had actually confessed and recanted several times to different people.
According to one witness, the boy confessed after "1 told him I was going to make him put his
hand on her [the victim]; that I heard, if a person had murdered another, make him put his hand
on her, and she will bleed afresh." 10 N.J.L. at 167. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the
confession, standing alone, of someone under the age of fourteen was sufficient for conviction.
Martin, 90 Ala. at 609. And in Clay, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the confessions of
three sixteen-year-old boys, who testified they confessed after being beaten by police, were admis-
sible. Clay, 126 So. at 464-65.
29. Godfrey, 31 Ala. at 326-27.
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execution.
Subsequently, the "principles" of Godfrey were "fully approved"
by the Alabama Supreme Court in the 1890 murder trial of a four-
teen-year-old black named Martin.30
In 1924, Elias Ridge, a fourteen-year-old black, was charged with
murder. In Ridge v. State , 1 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals expanded the list of factors that should guide a jury's consid-
eration in passing sentence on a youthful offender. "This crime was
reprehensible in the highest degree," a unanimous three-judge panel
wrote, "but the record shows that the perpetrator, by reason of his
youth, his lack of home training, and unfavorable environment,
probably had no adequate comprehension of the enormity of the of-
fense or of his criminal responsibility."32 The court modified his
death sentence to hard labor for life.3"
In 1959, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided Common-
wealth v. Green,34 vacating the death sentence of a fifteen-year-old
boy. The justices were persuaded by the importance of the defend-
ant's age in sentencing:
Of itself, Green's chronological age of 15 years would not justify the imposi-
tion of the lesser penalty, but his age is an important factor in determining
the appropriateness of the penalty and should impose upon the sentencing
court the duty to be ultra vigilant in its inquiry into the makeup of the
convicted murderer.35
3. Abuse of Discretion
By failing to consider the defendant's age and other circum-
stances, the jury was ruled by the court in Ridge to have abused its
discretion in sentencing Ridge to death.38 On similar grounds, the
sentence was overturned in Green: "The imposition of the death
penalty by a judicial tribunal should be made only when it is the
sole penalty justified by the criminal act and the criminal himself
and then only after a full and exhaustive inquiry into both the crim-
inal act and the criminal himself.""7 It was the duty of the sentenc-
30. Martin, 90 Ala. at 609.
31. 219 P. 649 (Okla. Crim. App. 1924).
32. Id. at 650.
33. Id. at 651.
34. Commonwealth v. Green, 151 A.2d 241 (Pa. 1959).
35. Id. at 246.
36. Ridge v. State, 229 P. 649, 651 (Okla. Crim. App. 1924).
37. Green, 151 A.2d at 247.
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ing court "to inquire and exhaust every avenue of information that
would inform it of the type of individual represented by that boy." 8
Instead, the trial judges were unfairly moved by "the manner of the
murder and the placation of . . . the public plaint."39
4. Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Supreme Court Cases
In his plurality opinion for Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v.
Missouri,40 affirming the death penalties for two offenders who com-
mitted their crimes at the ages of sixteen and seventeen, Justice
Scalia said that, under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion, "[tihe punishment is either 'cruel and unusual' (i.e., society
has set its face against it), or it is not."' 41 The Stanford Court ruled
that society had not set its face against the execution of a person
who committed murder at age sixteen. Justice Scalia concluded:
"We discern neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus
forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any person who
murders at 16 or 17 years of age. Accordingly, we conclude that
such punishment does not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment. 42
Justice Scalia noted that the offenders' punishment was not con-
trary to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society, '4 3 the standard the Court had previously
enunciated in 1958 to interpret the Eighth Amendment in Trop v.
Dulles." A year before Stanford, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,4' the
Court had decided that "it would offend civilized standards of de-
cency to execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time
38. Id.
39. Id. Justice Bell, in a mocking dissent, wrote:
I believe the majority's opinion would have been clearer and stronger if it had said
something like this: We are opposed to the death penalty, especially for young per-
sons. Notwithstanding all the authorities to the contrary, henceforth it shall be unlaw-
ful for a trial Court to impose the death penalty on any murderer who is under
-[sic] years of age.
Id. at 251 n.4.
40. 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989).
41. Id. at 378.
42. Id. at 380.
43. Id. at 379 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
44. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
45. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). As stated by Justice Stevens in his prefatory section, the Thompson
decision hinged on the conclusion that a fifteen-year-old could not have the culpability requisite to
mandate execution. Id. at 822-23.
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of his or her offense." 46
In fact, between 1964 and 1985, the United States did not exe-
cute any person for crimes committed while under eighteen years of
age. Thus, such executions had ceased eight years prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia.47
Furman had effectively invalidated capital punishment statutes on
the ground that the imposition of the penalty under existing laws
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 8
While all nine justices in Furman wrote separate opinions, reflect-
ing the difficulty the Court encountered in applying the Eighth
Amendment to the state statutes on the death penalty, according to
a majority of the Court, the existing sentencing procedures lacked
guidelines or standards and, as Justice Stewart said in concurrence,
were being "wantonly" imposed.4 9 Similarly, Justice White said that
there was "no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which
it is not." 50 Although several Justices were concerned that the death
penalty failed to serve the penological purposes of retribution and
deterrence,5 only Justices Brennan and Marshall held that it was
unconstitutional per se.5 2 Thus, several states reenacted death pen-
alty laws in the years following Furman, and in 1976 the Supreme
Court held, in Gregg v. Georgia,53 that "the punishment of death
does not invariably violate the Constitution. 54
In applying the Eighth Amendment, the Gregg Court combined
the "evolving standards of decency" test of Trop with its own test of
whether the punishment accords with "the dignity of man." The
Court said that, while an "assessment of contemporary values con-
cerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant" in deter-
mining the application of the Eighth Amendment, the penalty "also
must accord with 'the dignity of man,' which is the basic concept
46. Id. at 830.
47. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
48. Id. at 240-41; see Justice William Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication and the Death
Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 313 (1986).
49. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
51. See, e.g., id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 279-80, 305-06 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 342-59 (Marshall, J., concurring);
id. at 307 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 311-12 (White., J., concurring).
53. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
54. Id. at 169.
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underlying the Eighth Amendment." 5
For the moment, the Court has drawn the death penalty line at
age sixteen. This result is a product of casting the cruel and unusual
punishments clause not in light of those punishments and common
law rules of punishment Which existed at the time the clause was
written, 6 but in the context of contemporary societal norms. How-
ever, the Stanford plurality considered only "American conceptions
of decency" as dispositive, rejecting the relevance of "the sentencing
practices of other countries, '5 7 which the defendants and their amici
had submitted to show that international norms prohibit such pun-
ishment. It also rejected the proportionality analysis, that is,
whether "there is a disproportion 'between the punishment imposed
and the defendant's blameworthiness,' " and whether a punishment
makes any "reasonable contribution to acceptable goals of punish-
ment," saying that "we have never invalidated a punishment on this
basis alone."58
When faced with the task of applying the clause, the Court, from
the earliest cases, turned to the sparse legislative history of the
Eighth Amendment and the tenor of the time for guidance.59 It may
be recalled that the Eighth Amendment was introduced by James
Madison in the U.S. House of Representatives in June of 1789.60 It
had previously been written into Virginia's Declaration of Rights of
1776 by fellow Virginian George Mason, who adopted the language
from the English Declaration of Rights of 1688.1 In 1688, James
II, last of the Stuart kings, abdicated. Among the rights demanded
of the new monarchs, William and Mary, by their disgruntled sub-
jects, was that "Excessive Bail ought not be required nor Excessive
Fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 2 It is
worth noting that Madison changed the wording from "ought not"
to "shall not."63
But which punishments were cruel and unusual? When it came to
inflicting punishment, seventeenth-century England left little to the
55. Id. at 173.
56. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368-69 (1989).
57. Id. at 369 n.1.
58. Id. at 379, 393.
59. See. e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910).
60. See LARRY C. BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 7 (1975).
61. Id. at 5; 2 DAVID K. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1505 (1910);
Granucci, supra note 21, at 840-41.
62. See 2 WATSON, supra note 61, at 1505.
63. See BERKSON, supra note 60, at 7.
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imagination. The U.S. Supreme Court in Wilkerson v. Utah"' noted
examples "where the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the place of
execution, in treason; or where he was embowelled alive, beheaded,
and quartered, in high treason. Mention is also made of public dis-
section in murder, and burning alive in treason committed by a
female."68
American colonists of the period had a rough go as well. Death by
hanging, burning, and breaking on the wheel were common. 66 When
the Quakers arrived in North America in the 1650s, they were
"whipped, pilloried, stocked, caged, imprisoned, laid neck and heels,
branded and maimed" by New England's Christians.67 Four
Quakers were hanged.6 8
In colonial Virginia, James Madison's home state, the ducking
stool was a favorite form of punishment, particularly for women. It
consisted of tying a woman to a chair and plunging her under the
water "as often as the sentence directs in order to cool her immoder-
ate heat."69
Reviewing this history, it was understandably difficult for the
Court to begin drawing lines, bright or otherwise, that would distin-
guish constitutionally prohibited punishments from those sanctioned
by society. 0
64. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
65. Id. at 135; see also Done v. People, 5 Park. Cr. Cas. 364, 382-83 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1863).
The court in Done stated:
The punishments in England . . . were inflicted in various ways. Under the directions
of military courts he [the convict] was shot. When condemned by ecclesiastical tribu-
nals, he was not unfrequently burnt at the stake, as if his priestly judges designed that
the heretic, on the going out of this world, should have a foretaste of the punishment
to which they also consigned him in the next. For treason against the state the great
sword of justice was to fall. The condemned man was sentenced to be hung, taken
down while still alive, beheaded, disemboweled and quartered; with few exceptions,
however, the axe of the executioner only was used, and the criminal was simply be-
headed. If however, in case of high crimes, especially treason, the prisoner stood mute
and refused to plead, he might be sentenced to be pressed to death, a punishment
inflicted by placing the prisoner on his back, naked, in a cold dungeon, with his arms
and legs extended by cords to the four corners, and with iron or stone laid on his
breast, and left till death from cold, or pressure, or exhaustion, came to his relief.
Lastly, for the crime of murder and numerous other felonies, the criminal was sen-
tenced to be hung by the neck till he was dead.
id.
66. See Joseph J. Thompson, Early Corporal Punishments, 6 ILL. L. Q. 37, 38 (1923).
67. Id. at 39.
68. Id. at 40.
69. Id. at 41.
70. The Court considered the word "unusual" as it is used in the Eighth Amendment and
proposed that an ordinary meaning should be applied to its interpretation. See Trop v. Dulles, 356
1321
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However, Thomas Cooley, a respected publicist who was often
cited by the Court, concluded that "those degrading punishments
which in any State had become obsolete before its existing constitu-
tion was adopted, we think may well be held forbidden by it as cruel
and unusual.'
The Court's own approach was to view the clause as prohibiting
punishments that were inhuman, barbarous, or involved torture and
excessive punishments out of proportion to the offense.7 2 Except for
a period of four years during the 1970s, the death penalty was never
U.S. 86, 101 n.32 (1958).
71. 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 694 (Walter
Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927). See also 2 WATSON, supra note 61, at 1511 ("Usually the term
means punishment which would shock the human mind and feeling, like burning, or cutting off
the members of the body, or throwing the victim into boiling water.").
72. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) ("[I]t is safe to affirm that punishments of
torture, such as those mentioned by the commentator referred to, and all others in the same line of
cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the Constitution."); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
447 (1889) ("Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death."); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) ("It has been said that ordinarily the terms imply some-
thing inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like."); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)
("Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the
crime, but any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally sus-
pect."); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) ("Although the Framers may have intended the
Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their use of the language of
the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they intended to provide at least the same
protection - including the right to be free from excessive punishments."); Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) ("There is now little room for doubt that the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment
that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the bill of Rights was adopted.").
Granucci argues that England's cruel and unusual punishments clause was designed to prohibit
"severe punishment, unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction of the court to im-
pose." Granucci, supra note 21, at 859. To that extent, he says, the Supreme Court's focus on
excessiveness and proportionality completely misses the mark. Id. at 860.
The cruel and unusual punishments clause of Virginia's Bill of Rights of 1776 was interpreted
by Virginia's Supreme Court in Hart v. Commonwealth, 109 S.E. 582, 586-87 (1921). Justice
Sims wrote:
It has been uniformly held by this court that the provisions in question in the Virginia
Constitution, which have remained the same as they were originally adopted in the
Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, must be construed to impose no limitation upon the
legislative right to determine and prescribe by statute the quantum of punishments
deemed adequate by the Legislature; that the only limitation so imposed is upon the
mode of punishments, such punishments only being prohibited by such constitutional
provision as were regarded as cruel and unusual when such provision of the Constitu-
tion was adopted in 1776, namely, such bodily punishments as involve torture or lin-
gering death - such as are inhumane and barbarous - as, for example, punishment
by the rack, by drawing and quartering, leaving the body hung in chains, or on the
gibbet, exposed to public view, and the like.
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held to violate the Eighth Amendment." For example, in the 1878
case of Wilkerson v. Utah,"' the Court did not debate the propriety
of the death penalty itself, but whether the method - shooting
rather than hanging - was cruel and unusual. The Court held it
was not.78 Twelve years later in In re Kemmler,78 the Court stated
that "the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of
that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there is something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguish-
ment of life." 77
The issue of executing a juvenile offender did not come before the
Court until Eddings v. Oklahoma.7 8 In Eddings, a sixteen-year-old
murdered a highway patrol officer.7 9 The Court was asked to ad-
dress the issue of whether the infliction of the death penalty on a
child who was sixteen at the time of the offense constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.80 The trial court was required by
Oklahoma statute to consider mitigating evidence during sentenc-
ing.a" Yet the trial court failed to consider evidence of what the
Court called "Eddings' unhappy upbringing and emotional distur-
bance."'82 This violated the Court's own rule, announced in Lockett
v. Ohio,83 that "any aspect of a defendant's character or record"
must be considered in mitigation at the sentencing stage of a capital
trial to avoid violating the Eighth Amendment." '
Thus, the Court vacated Eddings' death sentence, but it did not
rule on whether the death penalty was per se cruel and unusual pun-
ishment and hence unconstitutional when imposed on a sixteen-year-
old person. Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Powell said,
"Because we decide this case on the basis of Lockett v. Ohio, we do
not reach the conclusion of whether - in light of contemporary
standards - the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of a de-
73. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
74. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
75. Id. at 134-35.
76. 136 U.S. 436 (1889).
77. Id. at 447.
78. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
79. Id. at 106.
80. Id.
81. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701-710 (1980).
82. 445 U.S. at 109.
83. 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
84. Id. at 604.
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fendant who was 16 at the time of the offense." 85
Six years after Eddings, a plurality of the Court, in Thompson v.
Oklahoma,86 ruled that executing a person who committed a crime
at age fifteen would violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.87 The petitioner, Thompson, had been sentenced to death in
Oklahoma for the murder of his former brother-in-law. The Court
did not examine the issue of whether or not executing fifteen-year-
old criminals was common at the time the clause was written, but in
a five-to-three decision it did vacate Thompson's death sentence.
Writing for four of the Justices, Justice Stevens looked to the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society" '88 and held that such executions were prohibited under
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Constitution.89 In
an exhaustive review of state legislation regarding age requirements
for voting, jury service, driving, marriage, the purchase of pornogra-
phy, and gambling, Justice Stevens concluded that most states con-
ferred these adult obligations, privileges or responsibilities on per-
sons sixteen years of age and above.90 He also examined state death
penalty laws and found that of the eighteen states which established
a minimum statutory age, all required the defendants to have been
sixteen years of age at the time of their offense."'
Aside from domestic legislation, Justice Stevens noted that the
practice of other nations could be informative on the issue of "evolv-
ing standards," and he observed that many other nations had re-
jected the death penalty altogether or refused to allow juveniles to
be executed. 92 Finally, according to the Court, only five persons who
were under the age of sixteen at the time of their crimes were sen-
tenced to death between 1982 and 1986." 3 The harsh punishment of
these five juveniles, said Justice Stevens, was "cruel and unusual in
85. Eddings. 455 U.S. at 110 n.5.
86. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
87. Id. at 838.
88. Id. at 821 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
89. Id. at 821-38; see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (noting that
"[tihe [cruel and unusual punishments] clause of the Constitution in the opinion of the learned
commentators may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." (emphasis added)).
90. 487 U.S. at 823-25, 839-48.
91. Id. at 829.
92. Id. at 830-31.
93. Id. at 832-33.
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the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." '94
Justice O'Connor concurred on the narrow grounds that the
Oklahoma statute, which set no minimum age at which capital pun-
ishment could be imposed and at the same time separately provided
that juvenile defendants may be treated as adults under some cir-
cumstances, failed to meet the standard of "careful consideration
that we have required for other kinds of decisions leading to the
death penalty."95 Under this law, Oklahoma could not execute a fif-
teen-year-old. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice White, dissented.96
Since the Court in Thompson did not reach a majority decision
on whether capital punishment for all offenders under sixteen vio-
lates the Constitution, the issue remains undecided.
In Stanford v. Kentucky, 97 the Court considered the death sen-
tence appeals of two defendants, ages sixteen and seventeen, and
held by five votes to four that the execution of these offenders was
permissible under the Constitution. Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia began his analysis by examining the English common law,
just as the state courts had done when confronted with sentencing a
child to death.98 When the Eighth Amendment was written, he
noted, the common law "theoretically permitted capital punishment
to be imposed on anyone over the age of 7."99 Finding no prohibition
in the common law of 1789, he then considered society's "evolving
standards" to determine if a consensus existed that such executions
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.100 He concluded that no
such consensus exists. He noted that "[in determining what stan-
dards have 'evolved,' however, we have looked not to our own con-
ceptions of decency, but to those of modern American society as a
whole." '
Justice Scalia opposed the notion that the practices of other na-
tions were germane to Eighth Amendment analysis. I0 2 He also re-
jected "public opinion polls, the views of interest groups, and the
94. Id. at 833 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 858 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in result).
96. Id. at 859-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
98. Id. at 368.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 369.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 369 n.I.
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positions adopted by various professional associations" which the de-
fendant introduced as evidence supporting the contention of an ex-
isting national consensus in opposition to the death penalty for a
sixteen-year-old defendant.' He characterized these submissions as
"socioscientific" or "ethicoscientific."' ' 4 The most persuasive expres-
sions of the public attitude, he wrote, "are statutes passed by soci-
ety's elected representatives."'' 0 5 In other words, Justice Scalia ar-
gued that the will of the majority should govern the Court's
consideration of the constitutionality of punishments imposed by
governments upon juveniles.' 06
Justice Scalia rejected evidence and arguments characterizing the
death penalty for Stanford and Wilkins as disproportionate and fail-
ing to serve the "legitimate goals of penology," namely retribution
and deterrence. 07 This inquiry is called for, in addition to that con-
cerning evolving standards of decency, under prior Supreme Court
cases, Coker v. Georgia'0 8 and Enmund v. Florida.0 9 While Coker
held that a penalty is "excessive" if it involves unnecessary infliction
of pain or when it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime, 10 Enmund held that if punishment fails to further the peno-
logical goals of retribution or deterrence, it amounts to unnecessary
103. Id. at 377.
104. Id. at 378. Scalia noted that "[tihe battle must be fought, then, on the field of the Eighth
Amendment; and in that struggle socioscientific, ethioscientific, or even purely scientific evidence
is not an available weapon." Id.
105. Id. at 370.
106. But see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958).
107. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 379. Scalia noted:
All of our cases condemning a punishment under this mode of analysis also found that
the objective indicators of state laws or jury determinations evidenced a societal con-
sensus against that penalty. . . .In fact, the two methodologies blend into one an-
other, since 'proportionality' analysis itself can only be conducted on the basis of the
standards set by our own society; the only alternative, once again, would be our per-
sonal preferences.
Id. at 379-80.
Justice O'Connor replied:
In my view, this Court does have a constitutional obligation to conduct proportionality
analysis. In Thompson I specifically identified age-based statutory classifications as
'relevant to Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis.' . . . Thus, although I do not
believe that these particular cases can be resolved through proportionality analysis,
I reject the suggestion that the use of such analysis is improper as a matter of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Id. at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
108. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
109. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
110. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
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and wanton infliction of pain. 1'
In Stanford v. Kentucky, the defense argued that "juveniles, pos-
sessing less developed cognitive skills than adults, are less likely to
fear death" and, "being less mature and responsible, are also less
morally blameworthy.""'  But, Justice Scalia stated that the juve-
nile death penalty would fail under equal protection arguments,
rather than the Eighth Amendment, if such arguments could be
conclusively proven." 3
Consequently, under the Stanford plurality's ruling, the fate of
juvenile offenders is to be decided solely by the voters of the fifty
states. The Court should not be so willing to defer to the preferences
of legislatures in analyzing cases under the Eighth Amendment. As
Chief Justice Warren wrote:
We cannot push back the limits of the Constitution merely to accommodate
challenged legislation. We must apply those limits as the Constitution
prescribes them, bearing in mind both the broad scope of legislative discre-
tion and the ultimate responsibility of constitutional adjudication. We do
well to approach this task cautiously .... But the ordeal of judgment can-
not be shirked.""
I 11. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
112. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377. The petitioners had the assistance of amicus briefs from, inter
alia, the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Orthopsychiatric Association,
and the Child Welfare League, joined in its brief by other organizations such as the National
Parent and Teachers Association and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. See, e.g.,
Comment, The Execution of Juvenile Offenders: Constitutional and International Law Objec-
tions, 60 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 113 (1991). See generally Edward Miller, Note, Executing Minors
and the Mentally Retarded: The Retribution and Deterrence Rationales, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 15
(1990).
113. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378.
114. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
378-79 (1910). The Court in Weems stated:
In [several cases] prominence is given to the power of the legislature to define crimes
and their punishment. We concede the power in most of its exercises. We disclaim the
right to assert a judgment against that of the legislature of the expediency of the laws
or the right to oppose the judicial power to the legislative power to define crimes and
fix their punishment, unless that power encounters in its exercise a constitutional pro-
hibition. In such case not our discretion but our legal duty, strictly defined and imper-
ative in its direction, is invoked. Then the legislative power is brought to the judgment
of a power superior to it for the instant.
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II. EMERGING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS WITH RESPECT TO
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF JUVENILES
A. In General
If the prohibition on the juvenile death penalty has almost ac-
quired the status of jus cogens, a nonderogable principle of interna-
tional law binding upon all nations, as some have argued,11 the
U.S. reservation to those provisions of the International Covenant
will have no effect. Assuming, however, that very few norms of in-
ternational law meet the jus cogens standard and these norms do
not encompass the juvenile death penalty prohibition, it is neverthe-
less fair to argue that under evolving international standards, there
is an emerging customary international law under which capital
punishment of juveniles is prohibited. Pertinent international agree-
ments, state practice, and views of respected professional organiza-
tions provide strong evidence of such an emerging norm.
B. International Agreements
In the recent past, several human rights instruments containing
prohibitions on either the death penalty itself or as applied against
juvenile offenders have been adopted by the international commu-
nity. Four major treaties of concern to the United States contain
language explicitly prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
came into force in 1976,116 states in Article 6, paragraph 5, that a
"[slentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by
persons below eighteen years of age . ...
During the period of negotiations and drafting of the Covenant,
neither the United States nor any other country objected to the ju-
venile capital punishment language as contrary to human rights
principles. Rather, the travaux preparatoires reveal that the con-
tents of Article 6 were already the consensus of nations." 8
The second pertinent agreement is the American Convention on
115. See, e.g., Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of Interna-
tional Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655 (1983);
Comment, supra note 112.
116. ICCPR, supra note 1.
117. Id. art. 6, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
118. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Int'l Human Rights Law Group in Support of Petitioner at
60, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (No. 86-6169).
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Human Rights,119 which states in Article 4, paragraph 5, "Capital
punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the
crime was committed, were under 18 years of age . . ,"I" Again,
during the drafting phase, the United States did not object to the
prohibition of the execution of juvenile offenders in the American
Convention, but it argued that setting a specific age limit in the
treaty failed to take into account the "already existent trend" to-
ward the abolition of the death penalty altogether. 2'
The American Convention was signed by nineteen OAS members,
ratified by sixteen of those, and pledged to be followed by four.'22
The United States never ratified the American Convention, in part
because the drafting Conference would not remove the proscription
of capital punishment for certain age groups. Instead, the United
States abstained on Article 4.123 After President Carter was unsuc-
cessful in his attempts to gain ratification in 1978,124 the Reagan
Administration never resubmitted it. Although the United States is
not a party to the Convention, it is subject to the recommendations
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commis-
sion), another organ of the OAS. Indeed, the Commission in 1987
found the United States to be in violation of a rule of jus cogens by
its practice of executing juvenile offenders. 2 5
The case involved the executions of James Terry Roach and Jay
Pinkerton, both seventeen at the time of their crimes. Of particular
concern to the Commission was the U.S. system under which each
state has its own laws on capital punishment and minimum ages
therefor. This, it said, results in a "hodge-podge of legislation" and
119. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/Ser. K/XVI 1.1,
Doc. 65 Rev. 1 Con. 1 (1970).
120. Id. art. 4(5).
121. Brief of Amicus Curiae Amnesty International in Support of Petitioner, Wilkins v. Mis-
souri, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); see Comment, supra note 112.
122. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 119.
123. See generally United States: Report of the Delegation to the Inter-American Specialized
Conference on Human Rights (Apr. 22, 1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 710 (1970); see also Note,
Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A Violation of An Emerging Rule of Customary
International Law, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 161, 179 (1990).
124. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Four Treaties, 14 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 395 (Feb. 3, 1978). The President had suggested that a reservation be entered
to Article 4, "subject to the Constitution and other laws of the United States." Id.
125. Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987), reprinted in
21.3 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 61, 73 (Robert E. Norris, Thomas Bu-
ergenthal eds., 1988); see Donald T. Fox, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Finds
United States in Violation, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 601, 602 (1988).
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arbitrary, inconsistent sentencing that reflects the location of the
crime more than its nature. 2 ' The finding of the Commission, how-
ever, has been the subject of criticism for its lack of thorough analy-
sis and reasoning.' 27
Signed in 1949, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,' 8
states, "In any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced
against a protected person [one held by a party to the conflict or an
occupying force of which he/she is not a national] who was under
eighteen years of age at the time of the offence."' 2 9 The United
States was one of 154 nations to sign the Fourth Geneva
Convention.'3
The 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibit
imposition of the death penalty on those whose crimes were commit-
ted while they were under the age of eighteen. The Additional Pro-
tocol relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) states in Article 77, paragraph 5, "The death
penalty related to the armed conflict shall not be executed on per-
sons who had not attained the age of eighteen years at the time the
offence was committed. 3' And the Additional Protocol relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) states in Article 6, paragraph 4, "The death penalty
shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of eigh-
teen years at the time of the offence .... 1,,32
The most recent of the treaties, the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, 3' requires States Parties to ensure that "[n]either capital
punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall
be imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years
of age."' 3 The United States has signed but has not ratified the
126. Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 125, paras. 64-65.
127. See Note, supra note 123, at nn.177-82.
128. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 286.
129. Id. art. 68, 75 U.N.T.S. at 330.
130. See Brief of Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law Group in Support of Peti-
tioner at 25-26, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
131. Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 77, reprinted in 16 I.L.M.
1391, 1425 (1977).
132. Additional Protocol, Protocol II, art. 6, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. at 1446.
133. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, U.N. Doc. a/44/736 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
134. Id. art. 37(a).
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Convention.
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
adopted a resolution at its 1984 Session which embodies a series of
safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the
death penalty. Safeguard 3 provides: "Persons below 18 years of age
at the time of the commission of the crime shall not be sentenced to
death . . . ." The Seventh U.N. Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders endorsed the safeguards in
1985; 111 in May 1989, ECOSOC adopted another resolution inviting
member States to review their legislation for the death penalty safe-
guards if they had not yet done so 36 (the United States has not yet
conducted such a review); 3 7 and in December 1989, the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly adopted the ECOSOC resolution on implementation
of the safeguards without a vote. 3 '
In December 1989, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Sec-
ond Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, obligating each State Party to "take all necessary
measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction," and
acknowledging a world-wide effort to abolish capital punishment for
all purposes. Six years earlier, Protocol 6 to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights abolished the death penalty in time of
peace."3 9
Under international law, a state may make a reservation provided
that the treaty permits it and that the reservation is not incompati-
ble with the objects and purposes of the treaty."0I It is arguable that
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, such
a reservation is not allowed."' A persuasive argument can also be
made that under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
135. Amnesty Int'l, U.S.A., The Death Penalty and Juvenile Offenders 78 (Oct. 1991).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Sixth Optional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, opened for signature Apr. 28,
1983, entered into force Mar. 1, 1985, Europ. T.S. No. 114, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 538 (1983).
140. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, art. 19(c), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 336 (stating that a State may not formulate a reservation which is "incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty").
141. See John King Gamble, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of
State Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372, 393 (1980); Fitzmaurice, Reservations to Multilateral
Conventions. 2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (1953); Note, The U.S. Death Penalty Reservation to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Exposing the Limitations of the Flexible
System Governing Treaty Formation, 29 TEX. INT'L LJ. (forthcoming 1993).
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such a reservation is incompatible with the objects and purposes of
the Covenant.142
It is particularly important to note that at the time of the negotia-
tion, drafting, and opening for signature of the International Cove-
nant, the Geneva Protocols, the American Covenant, and the Secur-
ity Council Resolutions, the United States had discontinued its use
of the death penalty on juvenile offenders. " Therefore, if indeed
the prohibition against the juvenile death penalty is customary inter-
national law, under any reading of U.S. practice in this area, its
reservation in 1992 is ineffective.
C. State Practice
An overwhelming number of countries have abolished the death
penalty for offenders under the age of eighteen. The United States,
in fact, remains alone among the industrialized nations in applying
the death penalty to juveniles between the ages of sixteen and eigh-
teen at the time of their crimes.'
With the assistance of Amnesty International and the Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Group, the petitioners in Thompson pro-
vided the Supreme Court with extensive authoritative evidence of
the current juvenile death penalty practices of the international
community. That information was given consideration on the basis
of the Court's having "previously recognized the relevance of the
view of the international community in determining whether a pun-
ishment is cruel and unusual.'14 As Justice Scalia later rejected
this argument in Stanford, it was for Justice Brennan to approve it
in his dissent, noting: "Our cases recognize that objective indicators
of contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in
other countries is also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analy-
sis.'' "4 Thus international standards would "inform" the Eighth
Amendment analysis. 47
142. See Gamble, supra note 141, at 393.
143. See I STREIB, supra note 25, at 55.
144. It is debatable whether Thompson actually set the minimum age limit for the death pen-
alty at sixteen, since only four of the justices - Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun -
stated that conclusion, with Justice O'Connor concurring in the result on separate grounds relat-
ing to the age limit in the state statute.
145. 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988).
146. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
147. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Amnesty Int'l in Support of Petitioner, Wilkins v. Missouri,
492 U.S. 361 (1989).
1332 [Vol. 42:1311
1993] JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY RESERVATION
As of February 1993, forty-nine countries have abolished the
death penalty for all crimes,14 and an additional fifteen have abol-
ished it for all but exceptional crimes. 49 The former include all
Western European countries but for Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Spain,
and the United Kingdom, which are all included in those retaining
only for exceptional crimes.1 5° At least seventy-two countries do not
allow the death penalty for offenders below eighteen, 51 including
notably Russia, South Africa, Syria, Paraguay, and Libya. Twelve
more countries have acceeded to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights without reservations to the relevant provisions
of those treaties and may therefore be considered to have also abol-
ished the juvenile death penalty.' 52 Of the reported juvenile execu-
tions between 1981 and 1991 worldwide, four were carried out in
the United States, one in Barbados (which subsequently changed its
minimum age for capital punishment to eighteen), one in Nigeria,
one in Bangladesh, and three in Pakistan. An unknown number of
juvenile offenders have been executed by Iran and Iraq.'53 In 1992,
another juvenile was put to death in the United States.154
In order for this great majority of opponents to the juvenile death
penalty to go beyond a standard of decency to become a basis for
customary international law, the element of opinio juris is neces-
sary. That is, the behavior of the country must be motivated by a
sense of legal obligation. As pointed out by Professor Joan Hart-
man, however:
Opinio juris poses the most troubling problem in constructing an intellec-
tually honest and convincing theory for customary human rights norms. Its
function is to distinguish between those habitual practices that are regarded
as binding legal obligations from those that result simply from courtesy or
diplomatic protocol, or from domestic policy considerations, and from which
departure can ensue without breach of international law. . . . But, as ap-
plied here, the doctrine creates a substantial theoretical barrier to the estab-
lishment of customary human rights norms. It is a difficult task to prove
that a state's treatment of its own citizens in such areas as capital punish-
148. Amnesty Int'l, U.S.A., The Death Penalty: List of Abolitionist and Retentionist Coun-
tries 2 (Mar. 10, 1993).
149. Id. at 3. "Exceptional crimes" are such as those under military law or crimes committed
in exceptional circumstances such as in wartime. Id.
150. Id.
151. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 135, at 78-79.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 79.
154. Johnny Garrett, age 17 at the time of his offense, was executed on February 11, 1992, in
Texas. See I STREIB. supra note 25, at 2.
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ment is directed by consciousness that its actions are governed by interna-
tional legal obligations.""
Regardless, as she points out, the proof of opinio juris is present, for
"what is the source of the nations' disinclination to execute juvenile
offenders other than a shared sense of the moral reprehensiveness of
the practice? 156
Rather than disallowing the development of opinio juris for this
context, Professor Hartman wisely demonstrates that the sentiments
expressed during the preparation of the International Covenant, for
one, do indeed evidence the consensus that international law forbade
the execution of juvenile offenders:
While efforts to adopt an abolitionist provision were defeated as unrealistic,
the view was expressed, without opposition, that the execution of juvenile
offenders was contrary to basic principles of respect for human rights and
should be prohibited explicitly in a treaty intended to be a comprehensive
codification of human rights norms. " '
Furthermore, "[t]he drafting discussions regarding these exemptions
[from the death penalty for pregnant women and those under eigh-
teen] focused on the appropriate wording of the exemption and
never questioned whether the exemption should be granted in the
first place."1 58
D. Professional Organizations
Thompson v. Oklahoma recognized voluminous evidence of pro-
fessional organizations' concerns about the juvenile death penalty.
Notably, briefs were filed by the American Bar Association, which
"oppose[d], in principle, the imposition of capital punishment upon
any person for any offense committed while under the age of eigh-
teen, ' ' 59 and the American Law Institute, whose Model Penal Code
states that "civilized societies will not tolerate the spectacle of exe-
155. Hartman, supra note 115, at 670.
156. Id. at 671.
157. Id. at 671-72 (citing discussions of the Third Committee delegates drafting article 6:12
U.N. GAOR C.3 (819th mtg.) at 287, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.819 (1957); 12 U.N. GAOR C.3
(818th mtg.) at 281, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/SR.818 (1957); 12 U.N. GAOR C.3 (816th mtg.) at 271,
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.816 (1957); 12 U.N. GAOR C.3 (815th mtg.) at 268, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/
SR.815 (1957); 12 U.N. GAOR C.3 (814th mtg.) at 263-64, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/SR.814 (1957);
12 U.N. GAOR C.3 (812th mtg.) at 255-57, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/SR.812 (1957); 12 U.N. GAOR
C.3 (811th mtg.) at 246, U.N. Doe. A/C.3/SR.811 (1957)).
158. Id. at 672 n.64.
159. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830 n.32 (American Bar Association, Summary of Action Taken
by the House of Delegates 17 (1983 Annual Meeting)).
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cution of children." 160
In addition to Amnesty International, the ABA, and the ALI in
Thompson, in Wilkins and Stanford a large number of authoritative
professional organizations gave powerful voice to the argument that
the death penalty is inappropriate for offenders under eighteen.
Briefs were filed by the following organizations: International
Human Rights Law Group, Child Welfare League of America (ex-
pressing the opposition of the National Parent and Teachers Associ-
ation, Child Welfare League of America, National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, Children's Defense Fund, National Associ-
ation of Social Workers, National Black Child Development Insti-
tute, National Network of Runaway and Youth Services, National
Youth Advocate Program, and American Youth Work Center), 6 '
National Legal Aid and Defender Association and National Associ-
ation of Criminal Defense Lawyers; American Society for Adoles-
cent Psychiatry; American Orthopsychiatric Association; and The
American Baptist Churches (expressing the opposition of American
Baptist Churches; American Friends Service Committee; American
Jewish Committee; American Jewish Congress; Christian Church
(Disciples of Christ); Mennonite Central Committee; National
Council of Churches; General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church
(USA); Southern Christian Leadership Conference; Union of Amer-
ican Hebrew Congregations; United Church of Christ Commission
for Racial Justice; United Methodist Church General Board of
Church and Society; and United States Catholic Conference).' 62
III. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The U.S. Senate should take the lead to join an overwhelming
majority of nations by withdrawing its reservation of the death sen-
tence on juveniles below eighteen at the time of the crime. Alterna-
tively, the U.S. Supreme Court should declare such punishment vio-
lative of the Eighth Amendment. It should be informed by
international standards in its constitutional analysis.
The Supreme Court had indeed opened the door to the influence
160. Id. at 830 n.33 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 commentary (Official Draft &
Revised Comments 1980)).
161. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Child Welfare League of America, Wilkins v. Missouri, 492
U.S. 361 (1989).
162. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Baptist Churches in Support of Petitioner, Wilkins
v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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of international standards of decency on the juvenile death penalty
question in Thompson v. Oklahoma,163 but snapped it shut in Stan-
ford v. Kentucky.'" Nevertheless, there remains a considerable
drive to again assert the influence of other nations' practices, and
there is good reason and adequate authority for doing so. Perhaps
the Supreme Court could decide that executing offenders for crimes
committed below the age of eighteen is a violation of a norm of
customary international law, binding upon the United States and
applicable to the states under the Supremacy Clause of the Consti-
tution. Also, the Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
could be informed by the practice of the international community.
Additionally, if the Court determines that there is no customary in-
ternational law norm, it could look to international agreements,
state practice, and the "climate of international opinion" to gauge
contemporary values.'6 5
First, international law - embodied in either treaties or custom-
ary international law - is a part of the "law of the land" and is
applicable by U.S. courts under the Supremacy Clause of the Con-
stitution. In the nineteenth-century admiralty case, The Paquete
Habana,'66 the Supreme Court declared that customary interna-
tional law, "the customs and usages of civilized nations," is federal
law and should be applied "as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for determination."' 67 Thus in Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala,'18 the Second Circuit found that the right to be free
from torture, as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, "has become part of customary international law, as evi-
denced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights."' 69 And the unreasonably lengthy detention of a Cuban in
Fernandez v. Wilkerson was found to be not a constitutional viola-
tion per se, but "judicially remedial as a violation of international
law."'170
In his effort to discern the standards of decency by which to
163. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
164. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
165. See Brief of Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law Group in support of Peti-
tioner at 17, Thompson (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1976)).
166. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
167. Id. at 700.
168. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
169. Id. at 882.
170. 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (1980), affd. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
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gauge the use of the death penalty, Justice Scalia said in Stanford
that "it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, re-
jecting the contention that the sentencing practices of other coun-
tries are relevant . . . . [because] they cannot serve to establish the
Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted
amfong our people." 17'
Initially it was Trop v. Dulles that referred to an "internationally
shared principle of civilized treatment."' 172 While the incentive to
look to international human rights procedural law and standards
may not yet be an established rule 173 that can dictate the U.S. Su-
preme Court's deliberations, nevertheless the Court can look to the
practices of other countries, the multilateral human rights instru-
ments, and the pronouncements of professional organizations and
publicists, as evidence of civilized practices to "inform" the Eighth
Amendment debate.174
In its plurality decision in Thompson, the Court noted that it had
"previously recognized the relevance of the views of the interna-
tional community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual."' 75 And it bolstered the "conclusion that it would offend
civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than
16 years old at the time of his or her offense"'' 76 with evidence of the
practices of other Anglo-American and leading western European
countries. 177
Then, when the Stanford Court refused to do so, Justice Brennan
pressed the point in his dissent. Justice Brennan reiterated figures
argued for the Thompson petitioners, "demonstrating that within
the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for juve-
nile crimes appears to be overwhelmingly disapproved.' 78 On the
other hand, Justice Scalia gave no authority for his governing pre-
171. 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989).
172. 356 U.S. 86, 100-03 (1958).
173. See Note, supra note 123, at 198-205 (citing, inter alia, Nicaragua v. United States,
1985-86 I.C.J.Y.B. [137] (1986), and summarizing Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)).
174. The human rights focus of Trop has been employed in other contexts as well, with respect
to both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, other than in death penalty cases. See Jordan J. Paust,
Constitutional Prohibitions of Cruel, Inhumane or Unnecessary Death, Injury or Suffering Dur-
ing the Law Enforcement Process, 2 HASTING CONST. L.Q. 873, 882 (1975).
175. 487 U.S. 815, 829 n.31 (1988).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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sumption that the standards for informing the Eighth Amendment
are to be limited to those of the United States only.
For the U.S. Supreme Court to give weight to the ramifications of
practices throughout the international community is not, however,
an automatic or easy next step. Although there has for years been a
growing tendency to do so, in the past those references to foreign
practices have simply fallen in the midst of and as extra support to
extensive reasoning for the ultimate conclusion, often as
footnotes.179
So the contention that the Court should place significant reliance
on "non-American" standards has understandably met with great
resistance. The fact is that constitutional case law actually begs for
the Court to do so. With respect to the death penalty in general,
ever since Gregg v. Georgia the Court has sought to discover "evolv-
ing standards of decency" which serve the "dignity of man."18 Un-
fortunately, what the Stanford Court reached was not so much a
standard as a lowest common denominator of existing usage. Indeed,
little effort was given at all to the search for a standard, which im-
plies just the opposite. The use of state laws is certainly an inade-
quate gauge of evolving standards of decency for the elevated pur-
poses of the U.S. Constitution. As one commentator has stated:
This is not an ideal way to determine the meaning of the Bill of Rights. If
legislatures alone were truly capable of protecting unpopular minority inter-
ests, then bills of rights would not be necessary. Legislatures, however, are
creatures of popular majorities. The courts, as guardians of the rights of
minorities should enforce those rights even when the majority does not ap-
prove. The analysis of Stanford abdicates the Court's function as a truly
independent judge of societal standards and as a guardian of Eighth
Amendment rights based on those standards. '8 '
The United States has been one of the most active participants in
the movement toward international respect for human dignity and
human rights. Although the Court reasonably seeks to protect an
"American" ethic and understanding of the death penalty, doing so
defeats its ability to reach a logical "standard of decency," unless it
would posit that the decency and the dignity of Americans are
somehow lower than those of the rest of the world. Judging from
those nations other than the United States which still allow the
179. Id.
180. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976).
181. Comment, supra note 112, at 118.
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death penalty for juvenile offenders,182 and, more importantly, those
which have actually executed for juvenile offenses within the last ten
years, if the U.S. law and practice truly aim at a standard of de-
cency, the Court must certainly incorporate an acknowledgement
that almost the entire world's standard of decency is far higher, or
else deliberately and explicitly abandon the Trop, Gregg, and
Thompson line of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Many different approaches have been put forth for the Court's
utilizing international juvenile death penalty standards. It is sug-
gested that the federal common law must acknowledge a customary
international law norm disapproving the practice, and that the
Court is obligated to employ these principles under the Supremacy
Clause. 83
As it has done in the past, the Court can also consider the prac-
tices of other countries to support such a conclusion. But it has not
yet undertaken to apply directly the well-evolved global standard of
decency and human dignity as the standard for measuring the con-
stitutionality of conduct. Simply put, there is no justification for an
"American standard" when the issue is human dignity. Holding out
such a standard is an affront to even the terms "decency" and
"dignity."
What is called for, therefore, is a definite shift toward an inclu-
sive and expansive view of the applicable standard. There is no rea-
son not to make that shift, though, and all justification for holding
onto a separate "American" standard has gone the way of the duck-
ing stool.
182. Amnesty Int'l, supra note 135, at 78-79.
183. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 115.
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